Saturday, December 29, 2007

Accountability

When I wanted to tilt someone attacking my play, I used to type "poker is easy" into the chat box. It gave the illusion that I didn't know what I was doing and I was just there to have a good time.

But there's also some truth to it. The games seem as beatable now as they've ever been, despite the UIGEA, the spread of poker knowledge and cries that the boom is over. As far as I can tell, the most significant difference in the online poker landscape is the consolidation trend within the industry discussed by BillRini.

Some people say the games are tougher, and maybe they are. But I don't see it, based on my experience playing hundreds of hands every day. It seems like the players per flop figures displayed in the Full Tilt lobby have never been higher.

Are the games really more difficult? Or is this a case of weaker players faulting external events for their shortcomings rather than taking personal responsibility for improving their own games?

Perhaps it's both: the games are tougher, but the strong players adapt and thrive.

"(Dan) Harrington says he returned to the felt only after he started watching poker on TV in 2003. 'I said, I remember how to play that no-limit hold'em, and I know how to play it better than they know how to play it,' he recalled. 'That's what got me out of retirement and got me playing again,'" according to a CardPlayer interview.

Taylor Caby also has seen players try to take advantage of him after he spends time away from the tables. He says in a video that opponents attempt moves on him, but he simply adjusts his strategy to counter them.

There's little doubt these guys and plenty more like them are doing just fine.

For me, the fear of tougher games held me back this year more than it should have. I lacked confidence, and I doubted whether I would still be able to kill the games once the effects of the UIGEA were felt at the tables.

I remember sitting in an airport all night long playing 2/4 games on PokerStars, just trying to grind out a profit without thinking about it. I spewed a lot of money trying to rebuild my roll on Full Tilt on autopilot. I chased bonuses instead of profits. I focused on attaining goals rather than figuring out how to reach them.

Even when I ran white hot in fall 2006, I didn't feel like I was doing anything special to deserve this kind of success.

It's time for me to acknowledge my poker competence as a necessary step toward continued improvement.

Do the fish still donate their stacks? Are the games still good? Is the poker boom going strong? Yes, yes and yes.

But my victories aren't due to circumstances. I'm not going to "blame" poker society for giving me a free ride toward earning these profits. I'm a solid player who can beat most any game I play in, and my results directly reflect the effort I've put into my improvement.

Poker is easy.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Poker Boom Stats

The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act was signed into law Oct. 13, 2006.

Peak cash players at U.S.-facing sites on Oct. 7, 2006 (from It's Always an Off Deuce and billrini):

Party Poker: 10263
Poker Stars: 8128
iPoker: 5927
Ongame: 4804
Microgaming: 3561
Full Tilt Poker: 3334
Paradise: 2917
Crypto: 2286
UB: 2013
Pacific: 1992
Bodog: 1763
IPN: 1707
Absolute: 1241
World Poker Exchange: 635

Total: 50,571

Peak cash players at U.S.-facing sites on Dec. 27, 2007 (from PokerScout.com):

PokerStars: 20386
Full Tilt Poker: 8605
UB: 2986
Absolute: 2287
Bodog: 2013
Microgaming: 1861
Cake: 1319
Merge Gaming: 472
World Poker Exchange: 134

Total: 40,063

Total including sites listed above that have since closed to U.S. players (Party Poker, iPoker, Ongame, Microgaming, Crypto, Pacific, IPN): 73,089

Comparison of peak cash players on current top three sites (PokerStars, Full Tilt and Party Poker) before UIGEA and today:

Oct. 7, 2006: 21,725
Dec. 27, 2007: 38,435

Note: Paradise Poker joined IPN (Boss Media) in February.

Tuesday, December 25, 2007

so sick for a donkey to be that bad

If you say so, dude. I thought I played it in the only way I'd get paid off in full.

2/4 NL
smizmiatch posts the small blind of $2
BB posts the big blind of $4
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to smizmiatch [Qd 9d]
1 fold
TakeUrCheese raises to $16
Button calls $16
smizmiatch calls $14
BB folds
*** FLOP *** [9s 9h 3d]
smizmiatch checks
TakeUrCheese has 15 seconds left to act
TakeUrCheese bets $42
Button folds
smizmiatch has 15 seconds left to act
smizmiatch calls $42
*** TURN *** [9s 9h 3d] [9c]
smizmiatch checks
TakeUrCheese has 15 seconds left to act
TakeUrCheese bets $70
smizmiatch has 15 seconds left to act
smizmiatch calls $70
*** RIVER *** [9s 9h 3d 9c] [3h]
smizmiatch has 15 seconds left to act
smizmiatch bets $313, and is all in
TakeUrCheese calls $313
*** SHOW DOWN ***
smizmiatch shows [Qd 9d] four of a kind, Nines
TakeUrCheese: sooooooooo sick
TakeUrCheese mucks
smizmiatch wins the pot ($899) with four of a kind, Nines
Seat 3: TakeUrCheese mucked [Jc Jd] - a full house, Nines full of Jacks
TakeUrCheese: so sick for a donkey to be that bad

Sunday, December 23, 2007

More Heads-up Basics

The quest to improve my heads-up game is slowly progressing, as I continue to make mistakes and learn from them. I've been watching videos, reading forums and practicing as I try to get better.

I wanted to write down a few points about better heads-up play while they're still fresh and I won't forget them.

Above all, it's important to remember that heads-up poker is still poker, and the same guidelines apply despite the necessary additional aggression. Solid play beats fishy play every time. Analysis and logic trumps formulaic play. Observation is essential.

I jotted down a few simple phrases on my laptop's notepad so I won't forget them as I play:

Take your time -- The pace of heads-up games is faster than other forms of poker because you see and play many more hands per hour. Smart opponents will take advantage of you if you fall into a pattern.

Read hands -- People often ask, "How do you accurately narrow hand ranges down so you can figure out how to play correctly?" That's an important question; unfortunately, it's also difficult to answer. A better approach is to attempt to make reads every time rather than fear the unknown. In my experience, there's no secret about how to make accurate reads. It's more a matter of using deductive reasoning to go step-by-step through an opponent's likely holdings, consider which of those cards are most probable, and decide on the best action given what you think you know.

Use pot control -- Strong opponents make frequent bets with a wide range of hands. There's nothing wrong with calling down a weak top pair or middle pair, or folding in a small pot when a scare card comes. Trying to take a stand at the wrong time with few outs has cost me a lot of money. Instead, it's often less costly to give a free card than to raise for information.

I'm still getting used to assigning values to various hands relative to the board. All hands go up in value compared to shorthanded or full-ring games, meaning there are times when top pair is a good hand to go broke with or slowplay. I'm not used to slowplaying top pair, but it becomes a powerful hand against a wide range.

I'm also working on my continuation bet frequency. Different opponents show varying responses, from frequent check-raises to folds to cold calls. I've run into people who will drain my stack by calling my bets down with bottom pair, while against others I've been able to catch their bluff-raises. I want to keep making strong continuation bets, but I've spewed a lot of money away when I keep making them but never seem to get any folds. The key is to play the player and adjust appropriately for the circumstances at hand.

Thursday, December 20, 2007

Picking on Ed Miller

I hope Ed Miller and his co-authors can consider themselves a success based on the amount of discussion and criticism they generate, because I can't resist pointing out their flaws.

Here's another passage from "Professional No-Limit Hold 'em" that didn't seem right to me:
Many players think experts win because they make these tough decisions well. They miss the point. Good players plan ahead to avoid tough decisions, and so should you.
It would be nice if poker were so easy to play that players could simply avoid all tough decisions by planning better. But that simply isn't the case.

Yes, it's true that avoiding tough decisions by planning your hands can help improve your game. But money isn't made by dodging difficult situations. Profits come from making correct decisions, whether they're simple or complicated. If you avoid all tricky circumstances, you'll forgo countless dollars that could be made when you have an edge.

Money is made by capitalizing on good values when you see them -- not by shying away from hands because they might be too hard to play. Solid poker players evaluate the circumstances and take the best action they can to maximize earnings.

Sacrificing EV to minimize risk makes little sense to me.

Here's another link to a post critical of the authors' claims about the benefits of buying in short: The availability error and short stack strategy.

Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Expanding games

Wow, the 3/6 and 2/4 NL games on Full Tilt have been incredibly loose over the last few weeks.

I can't explain it. Maybe it's the holiday season, the cold weather keeping people inside or the ease of making deposits. Whatever the reason, I'm not complaining. I've said this many times before: anyone who tells you the online games are filled with rocks is wrong or lying.

Now is the time to play and make the most of this opportunity. I know the games won't be this good forever.

On a separate topic, I'm impressed with a CardRunners video by CTS that I watched last night. In the vid, he plays three guys in heads-up 5/10 NL games and just demolishes them for 3.5 buy-ins over 225 hands. Sure, he runs pretty good. But he also makes ballsy plays based on reads and experience that are almost always correct.

I like the math he uses to find that a bluff he makes with an open-ended straight draw into a large pot needs to only be successful 17 percent of the time to show a profit:



What really stood out to me was his commentary on the importance of learning to play heads-up. It reminded me a lot of when I heard similar suggestions years ago about switching from full ring to shorthanded games. I struggled with 6-max games for a long time, but now they're my most consistent moneymakers.

The skills acquired from playing shorthanded directly result in higher profits, better hourly winrates and practice playing in tough situations.

I've had mixed results in heads-up cash games and backed off them entirely since I lost several buy-ins last month. I now realize I was playing too tightly preflop and I failed to properly identify and respond to my opponents weaknesses. Most actions can be countered by varying your play appropriately. I need to improve HU to bring my game to where it needs to be.

Specifically, I want to learn more about narrowing my opponents' hand ranges, correctly playing middling hands that gain value in HU situations and effectively increasing my bluffing frequency. I'm excited about the challenge.

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Vegas never fails

Vegas rules, as always. It says something about the city that it's still a blast even when I can't seem to win anything.

The weekend was the usual whirlwind of late nights, cards, donks, Brits in town for the Hatton-Mayweather fight and cowboys ready for the annual rodeo. And of course about 100 bloggers from across the world.

"Next year, I should wear a cowboy hat," Kuro said as we got to the airport Monday morning to leave Vegas. I think it's a great idea -- bloggers could blend right in with these fishy cowboys and help relieve them of their money. It would be hilarious.

During a weekend where I couldn't win on my own, I relied on others to help mitigate my losses.

Some quick hits:

_ Kuro took down 3rd place in the WPBT Winter Classic Tourney at the Venetian in an impressive display of solid play, keen instinct and an ability to stay out of trouble. He played a great tourney and put himself in position to win. He even got it in ahead on the last hand and had the eventual winner on the ropes at one point. I'm thankful I got a piece of his action!

_ The tourney was a fantastic structure in a great poker room. Thanks to Falstaff for organizing it, and I commend the Venetian for putting on a 9+ hour tourney and listening to our requests. It really shows that a quality poker room can put on an excellent tourney, unlike our horrible experience at the Orleans over the summer.

_ I was saved $220 for my share of a delicious dinner at Prime at Bellagio when Kuro, Fuel and myself high-carded for our $660 portion of the tab. As I recall, Fuel drew a Jack, I pulled a King and Kuro got stuck with the bill when he drew a 6.

RecessRampage, Schaubs, LJ and CC also attended the dinner, but they were too chicken to gamb00l for it. They were great company nonetheless, and I had a lot of fun getting to know them.

_ I ran like shit in casino games and at the poker tables. One hand in particular put me in a tight spot, and I'm not sure if I played it correctly.

It was getting late Friday night at the 2/5 ($500 max buy-in) table at the MGM when I was dealt Q9s in the CO. The game was very good, with about two terrible players and most of the rest your typical loose-passive tourists. Preflop raises never got any respect, so I had been playing tight but jacking it up big when I did come into a pot. My thinking was that I could capitalize on my tighter play by getting more money into the middle with hands that were ahead of my opponents' range.

So after a couple of limpers (I don't recall exactly how many), I raised it to $50 with my Q9 of hearts. A loose player cold called from the button, and one of the limpers or the blinds came along as well. There was $150+ in the pot preflop.

I hit very well on a flop of Ah 9c 3h, giving me middle pair and the nut flush draw. I decided to bet as much as I could while I knew I was likely to be at least tied with almost any hand out there, so I bet $150 when it was checked around to me. That bet committed me to the pot, which is what I wanted to happen. The button called again, and the limper folded.

With about $450 in the pot and $300 left in my stack, I decided to push the turn no matter what card fell. I believed I was so far ahead of my opponent's range that I could feel comfortable with getting it all in.

The turn was the Ace of spades -- one of the worst cards I could see. But having no evidence that the button had an Ace, I followed through with my plan and pushed all in. He thought for a few seconds before calling with AJ, and the non-heart Queen on the river did me no good.

If I made a mistake in this hand, it was raising it too big preflop. I got myself committed on the flop when otherwise I could have saved some money with a smaller preflop raise. I don't know though. It leaves a bad taste.

_ Bloggers are the best. I had an awesome time chatting, drinking and playing poker with all of you. I also enjoyed the meals, toasts at the MGM, Dutch Boyd sightings in the mixed game and bowling with metsfan, April, penneriii, shane, biggestron and Kuro.

Hope to see you in the summer!

Monday, December 03, 2007

Presto not so gold when all-in preflop

Woh, AK really was ahead of his range.

FullTiltPoker Table Promenade (6 max) - $2/$4
Seat 2: RunItTrim ($447.80)
Seat 3: smizmiatch ($423)
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to smizmiatch [Kh Ah]
2 folds
RunItTrim raises to $14 from CO
smizmiatch raises to $48 from Button
2 folds
RunItTrim raises to $160
smizmiatch raises to $423, and is all in
RunItTrim calls $263
smizmiatch shows [Kh Ah]
RunItTrim shows [5d 5s]
*** FLOP *** [As Kc 7s]
*** TURN *** [As Kc 7s] [Kd]
*** RIVER *** [As Kc 7s Kd] [Qd]
smizmiatch shows a full house, Kings full of Aces
RunItTrim shows two pair, Kings and Fives
smizmiatch wins the pot ($849) with a full house, Kings full of Aces

I had a hunch he was possibly 4-betting light. A note showed he had made a several 3-bets, and his 4-bet in this hand struck me as a strange amount. The 3.3 X raise felt awkward because it was less than pot-sized but more than a normal 3 X raise.

I like shoving AK in sometimes, but I don't feel confident about it unless I have a reason to believe my hand is live or if I'm against squeeze-happy players.

Saturday, December 01, 2007

Relative position

It really irks me when I see bad advice passed off as the truth, especially when it comes from a so-called "Noted Poker Authority." I'll comment on an excerpt from the pretentiously titled of "Professional No-Limit Hold 'Em: Volume One." Volume two hasn't been written yet.
Relative position means being to the right of the likely bettor, so you get to see how everyone else responds before you act. Sometimes having relative position can be more useful than having absolute position. For instance:

A player in a 9-handed $1-$2 game with a $100 capped buy-in has been going all-in every other hand for the last 20 hands. No one is standing up to him without a premium hand. He now has $268. You are first on the list to get into the game, and you will buy in for $100. You decide you should call the frequent all-in player for all your chips with ace-ten or better, and any pair of sixes or better. Two seats open up, one on his immediate right and the other on his immediate left. Which seat do you take?

Consider your worst all-in hand, ace-ten offsuit. If you sit to this person's immediate left and call all-in, any of the other players could play as well. If one of them has AA, KK, QQ, JJ, AK, AQ, or AJ, you take the worst of it. However, if you sit to the immediate right of the slider, you see what everyone else does before you commit. You can limp with ace-ten offsuit, then get all-in if no one else calls him. If instead someone plays, you can fold.

With relative position, you will often get to check to the likely bettor, then see how every other opponent reacts before committing your chips. That is why, contrary to conventional wisdom, it can sometimes be better to be on the right of a very aggressive player. Most of the time, however, absolute position is more important than relative position.
First of all, relative position does not mean being to the right of the likely bettor. Relative position is your position in relation to the preflop raiser. Whether you would rather have a relative position to the right or left of the likely bettor is debatable. I would prefer to be to the left of the likely bettor in most situations.

Then the book gives a contrived example of a situation in which it would be better to be sitting to the right of the likely bettor. The argument is that you can limp or check to the raiser to see how he and the remaining players act before deciding how to proceed with your hand. Presumably, you would check-raise with stronger hands and fold weaker hands.

This reasoning may work in the example, but how often are you going to be sitting to the right of a player who goes all in every hand? How often will you cold-call out of position preflop and then check when you hit your hand? How often will you make more money from a check-raise or a limp-raise than you would have made from playing your hand straightforwardly?

The example portrays a false reality that doesn't frequently occur in actual play. It's poor strategy to sacrifice absolute position, give up control of the hand and open yourself up to re-raises unless you have a premium hand. We all know how rarely the combination of being dealt a premium hand, getting action and having it hold up happens.

I would much rather be to the left of the maniac. I could frequently reraise him for isolation, bet for value when I hit my hand, bluff him with greater accuracy and get it all in with more information than I would have out of position. The exception comes in multiway pots where you gain more information by letting the maniac bet and waiting to see how others will react.

But most pots are contested heads-up, especially in games where there's lots of raising preflop. In heads-up hands, I want to control the action and pot size, which is much more easily accomplished from the maniac's left.

Limping and checking is usually weak poker. While there are extreme circumstances where a maniac is so aggressive and predictable that you want him to your left, those scenarios are rare.

Friday, November 30, 2007

Beginning

Don't tilt. Play good poker. Don't worry about variance. Concentrate on making good decisions. Be aggressive. Make strong reads.

These are some of the bedrock phrases poker players tell themselves over and over again as they try to cope with losses while maintaining the same focus needed to keep winning. Sure these sayings are cliched and overused, but that doesn't make them any less true.

The difficulty is that these words get old and lose their meaning, while improving my game is just as challenging as it always was. I'll never reach a point where I'll feel like I've plugged all my leaks. I'll always have to prove myself over and over again.

I must constantly rededicate myself to the principles of winning poker: don't be results oriented, avoid formulaic decision making, take advantage of every edge.

The tedium of discipline is tough to live with, but it's also a part of what makes this game great. Each day is a clean slate, each action a single data point among countless decisions that eventually add up to something.

I love the grind.

Thursday, November 29, 2007

No original content here

Check out cmitch's post on playing AK preflop in different scenarios.

I like lucko's suggestions and the EV calculations at the end of the post.

Just don't take it the wrong way and spew chips:

5/10
CO raises to $20
Button raises to $80
Gnome raises all-in for $1,000 from the BB with As Kd
CO folds.
Button calls all-in.
Flop: Qs 8d Td
Turn: 4c
River: 6s
Button wins $2,079 with Kc Ks

Friday, November 23, 2007

Top 10 Hold 'em Books



10. No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice: I just didn't get much out of it.









9. Little Blue Book: This book isn't revolutionary, but I enjoyed reading the hand histories. I agree with most of Gordon's analysis, which is more than I can say for plenty of other hold 'em books.







8. Theory of Poker: Everyone says this book is one of the very best, but it didn't stand out to me except for the Fundamental Theorem of Poker.










7. Super/System: Gotta give it up for the classics.











6. Hold 'em Poker for Advanced Players: These fundamentals of hold 'em gave me a solid foundation to learn from.










5. Harrington on Hold 'em (Vols. 1-3): Probably the most important book since the poker boom based on M alone.









4. Professional No-Limit Hold 'em: While this book has its flaws, it breaks some new ground on no limit. Its concepts on hand planning are useful and understandable.









3. Winning in Tough Hold 'em Games: Short-Handed and High-Stakes Concepts and Theory for Limit Hold 'em: This book is the real deal. It preaches aggressive tactics for difficult games. While this is a limit book, many of its ideas are applicable to other forms of poker as well.








2. Ace on the River: If you judge books by whether they help you make money, this one gets an A in my book. It's light on strategy but puts me in a winning mindset. I've read through it twice, and I went on crazy winning streaks both times afterward.








1. Small Stakes Hold 'em: No other poker book is so complete from start to finish, with page after page of practical ideas about how to analyze and execute hands. I didn't win the most money immediately after reading "Small Stakes Hold 'em," but it paid off in the long run.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

"Professional No-Limit Hold 'Em"

Ed Miller and company drive me crazy -- they come up with compelling new concepts and then ignore the reality of how today's no limit games play.

"Professional No-Limit Hold 'em"
by Matt Flynn, Sunny Mehta and Miller shows off the best and worst of 2+2 publishing. The book makes you think about pot commitment, bet sizing and stack adjustment ideas while misapplying them to practical situations. Many parts of the book come off as anything but professional, from the constant typos to the faulty hand examples and sometimes awful advice about preflop raising. It repeats some of the same problems that I pointed out about "No Limit Hold 'em: Theory and Practice."

I'll start with the book's strengths.

It is focused throughout on the idea of quickly planning your hand and bets to avoid messy situations. I like this approach because the authors develop new terminology to more clearly define existing stratagems that experienced no limit players know from thousands of hands of practice. It's similar to when David Sklansky came up with the term "semibluffing" to clarify the existing term "bluffing with outs."

Here's a sampling of the book's vocabulary:

_ Commitment threshold: You reach the commitment threshold when you have invested more than 10 percent of your effective stack size. This means that one more largish bet will get you pot committed in many situations.

_ Commitment: Players are usually pot committed if they have invested more than one-third of their effective stack into the pot. At first, this appears to be a low proportion, but it makes sense because after betting a third of your stack, you're only one pot-sized bet away from being all-in.

_ The REM Process: REM stands for Range, Equity and Maximize -- three steps you should take when evaluating your place in a hand. No shit, Sherlock.

_ SPR: SPR stands for stack-to-pot ratio, which is a number used to plan your hand from the flop onward based on whether it's a top pair hand, overpair or drawing hand. The meat of the book is spent on SPR, which I believe to be a useful but inherently flawed metric.

I won't delve into the details of SPR here because the book does that well enough over about 150 pages. Suffice it to say that SPR fails to accurately account for multiway pots and adjust to differing playing styles. Above all, its chief shortcoming is that the authors use it to rationalize weak play that simply won't fly in many of the 2/5 and 5/10 games that are used in the hand examples.

This is where we get to the book's problems. Although it does a good job of introducing new ways of thinking about hand planning, it falls short when it comes to practical application. I think of it as the difference between a graduate student and a working professional. The graduate student might write a solid thesis, but there's often a reason he can't cut it in the real world.

I can see how thinking about SPR can be a useful practice, but it's more of a means to an end than the end itself. By that I mean that I will use SPR to observe and evaluate likely outcomes, but I won't tailor my preflop play to achieve a certain SPR number. My reasoning is that favorable SPRs only serve to make hands easier to play; they do not necessarily result in higher expected value.

For example, the book suggests limping or minraising with AA or KK for pot control purposes. That misses the point that strong raises with premium hands gets more money in the pot when you have the best of it.

Here's another example: The book recommends occasional raises with suited one-gappers if it will result in an unfavorable SPR for your opponent. But I don't think it really matters to most opponents whether they have an unfavorable SPR or not because they're going to play the hand in the best way they know how, even if their stack size might not be just right for that hand type.

A few of the hand examples in the book are a mess. They place too high of a value on pot control while ignoring that solid players will simply destroy you with overbets and river bluffs if you consistently play hands in a style that's afraid to commit too many chips.

It makes me wonder if the authors of this book are truly professionals. Do they really play in 2/4 and up NL games online? Do they win? Do they practice what they preach? I don't believe it for two reasons: their advice frequently won't stand up to aggression, and I've never seen even one winning player in any of the games I play effectively use this style.

I have a few other complaints. In one of the hand examples, the blinds are incorrectly listed at 50/100 instead of 2/5. Another hand example is from a hypothetical online 2/5 NL game, which isn't even spread at any of the sites open to U.S. players (that I know of). In one paragraph, the authors call a raise from $20 to $75 a "huge overbet," which is just plain wrong because the raise to $75 was exactly a pot-sized raise.

These kinds of things make me seriously question the book's credibility. It should have some peer review, or at least decent copy editing.

Despite all these problems, I would recommend "Professional No-Limit Hold 'em" (I guess no-limit is hyphenated these days?) for players who can separate its strengths from its weaknesses. I wouldn't suggest it for players who are looking to replicate the style advocated within because they'd get run over.

I measure poker books based on whether they make me a better player. By that standard, I have to admit this book is a winner. It introduced me to alternate playing styles and new ideas that give me additional perspective when playing hands. It forced me to think harder about commitment and planning of my plays.

I'll treat it more like a work of untested theory than a textbook based on fact.

Monday, November 19, 2007

Blogger Big Game: Second Thoughts

I'm in Seattle on the second layover of my return trip from Detroit to Honolulu. Fortunately, long plane rides bring on a level of boredom where I'm able to run lengthy equity calculations because I have nothing better to do.

So I decided to try to answer a question left over from this morning's post about the Blogger Big Game: How much equity does emptyman gain from calling a reraise with 88 and calling a flop shove on any lowcard flop compared to simply pushing all-in preflop?

The answer: Very little, if any.

He's at a distinct disadvantage against my tight 3-betting raising range, although he gains value if I'm raising with a wider range.

Even against wider raising standards, there's little discernible difference in equity for emptyman between playing his hand the way he did and simply taking the coinflip preflop.

That said, he wasn't wrong to play 88 this way. While he doesn't gain value from his play, he does increase his chances of survival if he's willing to fold on any flop with an Ace, King or Queen. If the flop came with high cards, he would have lost only the 13,000 he invested preflop instead of his whole stack.

Emptyman's equity won't increase by waiting to see a flop, but he minimizes the chance of busting.

In cash games, value is king because the chance of losing your stack is irrelevant as long as you're making the correct play. MTTs are more about managing risk. Emptyman did well to plan his moves in advance and give himself an opportunity to get away from many hands that dominate him.

Blogger Big Game: No Cigar

I finished in 5th place of the Blogger Big Game last night for a $252 payout -- an OK result considering that it took a couple of suckouts to get there, but disappointing because I have myself to blame for busting.

My tourney came down to a crucial hand against emptyman. With blinds of 800/1600/200, I was in second place with an M of 19 at the start of the hand as we were playing five-handed.

Here's the hand:

FullTiltPoker Game #4224199836: Blogger Big Game (31592875), Table 5 - 800/1600 Ante 200 - No Limit Hold'em - 0:42:21 ET - 2007/11/19
Seat 2: OtisDart (16,034)
Seat 4: smizmiatch (66,342)
Seat 5: VinNay (90,886)
Seat 8: jeciimd (43,252)
Seat 9: emptyman (38,486)
OtisDart antes 200
smizmiatch antes 200
VinNay antes 200
jeciimd antes 200
emptyman antes 200
VinNay posts the small blind of 800
jeciimd posts the big blind of 1,600
The button is in seat #4
*** HOLE CARDS ***
Dealt to smizmiatch [Kc Ad]
emptyman raises to 4,800
OtisDart folds
smizmiatch raises to 13,000
VinNay folds
jeciimd folds
emptyman calls 8,200
*** FLOP *** [9d 3s 5d]
emptyman checks
smizmiatch bets 53,142, and is all in
emptyman calls 25,286, and is all in
smizmiatch shows [Kc Ad]
emptyman shows [8s 8d]
Uncalled bet of 27,856 returned to smizmiatch
*** TURN *** [9d 3s 5d] [2h]
*** RIVER *** [9d 3s 5d 2h] [2s]
smizmiatch shows a pair of Twos
emptyman shows two pair, Eights and Twos
emptyman wins the pot (79,972) with two pair, Eights and Twos
emptyman: woot!!!!
smizmiatch: nh
*** SUMMARY ***
Total pot 79,972 | Rake 0
Board: [9d 3s 5d 2h 2s]
Seat 2: OtisDart folded before the Flop
Seat 4: smizmiatch (button) showed [Kc Ad] and lost with a pair of Twos
Seat 5: VinNay (small blind) folded before the Flop
Seat 8: jeciimd (big blind) folded before the Flop
Seat 9: emptyman showed [8s 8d] and won (79,972) with two pair, Eights and Twos

Emptyman played this hand well.

With 88, he had to raise preflop, and his call of my raise was good as well. He could have pushed preflop, but I don't think you want to be putting all your chips in against a bigger stack who has reraised you unless you're shortstacked.

I imagine emptyman was thinking that he would call preflop and call any shove on a flop that did not contain an Ace, King or Queen.

I had a sense that he might have a middle pocket pair, but I couldn't resist betting 25,000 into a 25,000 pot when he checked it to me on the flop.

If I had been known better, I wouldn't have pushed all-in if I knew he was planning to call a push on most lowcard flops.

It's fun to think about, though: If he knew that I knew what he was doing, then I would only push with hands that could beat his 88. Then he would have had to fold. Instead, he correctly read that I would push most any flop if he checked it to me.

In the future, I will be able to maximize my equity if I read this situation correctly next time. I'll make more money with overpairs against instacallers with middle pocket pairs, while losing the least amount possible with AK.

I believe this is an important tactic for tourney play that I've screwed up quite a few times in the past as well. I'm starting to get it.

Congrats to VinNay for taking the tourney down! Once he got the big stack, he was hard to tangle with.

Thursday, November 15, 2007

New Layout

I had been using the layout below for a while. It had a plain dark background and yellow card backs. On the card fronts, this layout displayed solid four-colored cards, borrowed from the PokerStars Hyper-Simple Theme.





This table background and cards are taken from a very long Full Tilt mods thread on 2+2. The part of the thread linked here contains zip files for avatars, buttons, tables and elements -- more mods than most people will ever need.

But there were a few aesthetic changes that I needed to make.

I found that I preferred a lighter background, like the Stainless Steel used by Kaja. I wanted bigger cards (also included in the 2+2 link above) so I would be able to tell more easily who was in the hand. I decided I felt more comfortable with the traditional white-backed 4-color deck.

I ended up with this. The cards are huge.


Here's a look at the PokerAce layout I'm working with these days:



The left-hand column with white numbers is aggression frequency by street: flop, turn and river.

The green number is VP$IP, and the purple number is Folds to Continuation Bet percentage.

The red figure on the right-hand column is Preflop Raise, the yellow is Went to Showdown and the blue is number of hands.

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Spewage

Wow, I played some hands really poorly last week.

I just looked back at my hand histories over 6,742 hands played -- many more than I usually play. That's the first sign that I was asking for trouble, considering that the most obvious dropoff in my winrate comes in sessions of more than 2 hours.

Usually, when I look back at hand histories, I might find a few setup hands, a couple of hands that I could have played better, and one big mistake. This time, I found a lot of mistakes.

_ AK cold calling on a dangerous flop with only a gutshot, hitting the gutshot on the turn and losing to a flush. I never should have called that flop in the first place.

_ Going out of control with top pair in a few heads-up matches.

_ Getting in with QQ vs. AA preflop.

_ Making an incorrect read that I could make a solid player fold top pair, shit kicker to my top pair, shittier kicker heads-up.

_ Check-raising a dangerous turn card all-in with top pair. My opponent had hit his gutshot straight.

Sure, there was some bad luck in these hands. But they were all avoidable.

Notes to self: Remember to fold when beaten, and don't go bust with top pair.

They're kind of funny in retrospect.

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Results Oriented

"Parcells believed that even in the NFL a lot of players were more concerned with seeming to want to win that with actually winning, and that many of them did not know the difference."
--"The Blind Side," by Michael Lewis


I set a goal, and I was going to stick to it.

I wanted to rebuild my Full Tilt bankroll from $3,000 to $10,000 before moving up in stakes on other sites where I keep most of my roll. There were several reasons for this challenge: I wanted to rejuvenate my Full Tilt account without making a deposit, experiment with new tactics at 2/4 and 3/6, and prove to myself that I could set a goal and reach it.

I planned to get there in three weeks.

I did well at first, slowly building up on Full Tilt until I got to $8,500. There was nothing spectacular about this run -- just steadily building up toward where I wanted to be. But then things started to go wrong.

I found the juiciest 50/100 shorthanded limit game I had ever seen, with a table average VP$IP of about 48 and a seat open next to a player who was seeing nearly every flop. I felt my overall bankroll could support sitting at this table, so I decided to take a shot.

First I put in a lot of bets with an underboat vs. an overboat. Then QQ got cracked. Then KK fell. Within a few minutes, I was down $4,500. Oh well, I told myself. I knew the risk going in.

When I woke up the next morning, I was determined to push hard toward my goal. Back at 2/4, I opened up my game with lots of 4-bets, steal attempts and efforts to push every little small edge I could perceive. I spewed chips at an alarming rate.

I tried to be the kind of loose-aggressive player who would get paid off because my holdings would be so unpredictable. Instead, I seemed to only get action when I didn't want it.

Down to about $1,500, I dug in. For the first time, I was worried about dropping to dangerously low levels. I played tight -- too tight. I played weak. In one hand against cmitch, I may have been able to take it down with a bet or check-raise on the turn when I made trips. Instead, I meekly called a bet and then paid off on the river when his flush got there.

I dropped down to .50/1 to build back up again. I told myself I could be like Chris Ferguson, and slowly get back to where I wanted to be one small step at a time.

After only two days of play, I lost patience. How could I waste this time playing .50/1 when I could be winning at 5/10 -- or even having a go at 10/20? What was I doing grinding out $2 and $4 pots when my yearly average is so much higher?

I was fully aware that these thoughts would only get me into trouble. The only two options were to stick with my plan for weeks or months of more frustration, or to take one more chance. I played a few topsy-turvy 2/4 heads-up matches, and my roll fell below $200 by the time I was through.

When I dropped this low, I realized what a fish I had been. But it also enabled me to accept failure. I try to treat poker like an investment. It was time to cut my losses.

I adopted a better plan: abandon my goal, transfer money to my Full Tilt account rather than try to rebuild on a short roll, play the limits I wanted to play and quit steaming over a useless challenge.

From the start, this effort was focused on trying to reach a number rather than improving my game. It had little to do with getting better or making smarter decisions.

I like to learn from my mistakes:

1) I never want to play on a site when I'm underrolled. It's too difficult to play my best game when I'm scared to take chances.

2) I should remember that pushing too hard is often counterproductive. I thought I had learned long ago that I can only play my best game for about 2 hours at a time, and the probability of losing money greatly increases when I try to extend sessions beyond that.

3) It's OK to experiment with new strategies and take shots, but I should only try one at a time.

I'm a lucky bastard. As soon as I abandoned my quest, I started winning again. I'm back to playing a style I'm comfortable with -- my style -- and I've won $3,500 in the last three hours at the tables. That's a rate I can be happy with.

Monday, November 12, 2007

True or False?

A couple of recent Cardrunners videos bring up some counterintuitive tactics that I'm not sure I agree with. I'm not saying that Cole South and Brian Townsend are wrong, but a couple of their suggestions raise questions in my mind.

1) CTS 2 $1-2 NL: On the last hand of the video, CTS raises to $7 from the cutoff with AK, and the tight-aggressive button reraises to $24. CTS 4-bets to $61, the button raises all-in, and CTS calls the rest of his 125 BB stack -- another $218. The button naturally turns over AA, dominating CTS completely and costing him a buy-in.

CTS claims he played the hand correctly. "One hundred big blind stack, cutoff vs. the button, I'm certainly not going to play that any different," he says.

True or false? Is this really a good play? Why?

A commenter in the video thread asks the same question:
I dont understand the comment at that AK vs AA hand against the tightest player at the table. You said thats a cooler but I dont agree with that. The guy raised you just 2 or 3 times, he could have big hands, and that last hand he shoved after a 4-bet !! You still think that was a good play and a cooler ?
Someone else responds:
You have to understand that CTS was taking his image and their positions into consideration. Scarecrow was playing tight at first, but near the end he was beginning to 3bet CTS more, plus his stats were leveling off to raising 15%. This, combined with CTSs 4440 stats and the fact that they were CO vs button means AK is a favourite over scarecrows range.
2) Sbrugby 21 $5-10 NL: Sbrugby is the BB with JTs. The button raises, and the small blind calls. Sbrugby says calling from the big blind with a hand like JTs is wrong. True or false?

Thursday, November 08, 2007

Tagged

Jl514 and Gadzooks64 tagged me. I also did this when I was tagged in May:

A). Link to the person that tagged you and post the rules on your blog...
B). Share 7 random and/or weird facts about yourself...
C). Tag 7 random people at the end of your post and include links to their blogs...
D). Let each person know that they've been tagged by leaving a comment on their blog.

1. I've been to 19 MLB stadiums in my quest to see them all. Two of them have since been torn down, and several more new ones are being built, so by my count I have 16 to go.
2. I hate olives.
3. Bacon is life.
4. I was good at video games when I was a kid, but I've totally lost it except for Street Fighter II, Super Mario Bros and Zelda.
5. I changed the blog template because I got sick of that yellow background.
6. I'll never bet against my favorite teams, the Braves and UGA, and I don't like betting on them at all.
7. I've witnessed six executions by injection.

No more tags from me!